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Abstract
We introduce a graphical framework for fair division in cake cutting, where comparisons between
agents are limited by an underlying network structure. We generalize the classical fairness notions
of envy-freeness and proportionality to this graphical setting. Given a simple undirected graph G, an
allocation is envy-free on G if no agent envies any of her neighbor’s share, and is proportional on G
if every agent values her own share no less than the average among her neighbors, with respect to her
own measure. These generalizations open new research directions in developing simple and efficient
algorithms that can produce fair allocations under specific graph structures.
On the algorithmic frontier, we first propose a moving-knife algorithm that outputs an envy-free
allocation on trees. The algorithm is significantly simpler than the discrete and bounded envy-free algo-
rithm recently designed in [3] for complete graphs. Next, we give a discrete and bounded algorithm for
computing a proportional allocation on descendant graphs, a class of graphs by taking a rooted tree and
connecting all its ancestor-descendant pairs.
1 Introduction
In a nutshell, economics studies how resources are managed and allocated [13], and one of the most fun-
damental targets is to achieve certain fairness in the allocation of resources. In a standard setting, different
people have possibly different preferences on parts of a common resource, and a fair allocation aims to
distribute the resource to the people so that everyone feels that she is treated “fairly”. When the resource is
divisible, the problem is also known as “cake cutting”, and two of the most prominent fairness notions in this
domain are envy-freenss and proportionality. Here an allocation is envy-free if no agent i envies any other
agent j; formally, this requires that for all i, j ∈ [n], vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj), where vk is the valuation function
of agent k and Ak is the part allocated to agent k. It is known that an envy-free allocatio always exists [7].
However, it is until recently that a finite-step procedure to find an envy-free allocation was proposed [3]. A
weaker fairness solution concept is called proportionality, which requires that each agent gets at least the
average of the total utility (with respect to her valuation). Envy-freeness implies proportionality, but not
vice versa.
When studying these fairness conditions, almost all previous works consider all (ordered) pairs of re-
lations among agents. However, in many practical scenarios, the relations that need to be considered are
restricted. Such restrictions are motivated from two perspectives: (1) the system often involves a large
number of people with an underlying social network structure, and most people are not aware of their non-
neighbors’ allocation or even their existence. It is thus inefficient and sometimes meaningless to consider
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any potential envy between pairs of people who do not know each other; (2) institutional policies may intro-
duce priorities among agents, and envies between agents of different priorities will not be considered toward
unfairness. For example, when allocating network resources such as bandwidth to users, priorities will be
given to users who paid a higher premium and they are expected to receive better shares even in a considered
“fair” allocation.
To capture the most salient aspect of the motivations above, in this paper, we initialize the study of fair
cake cutting on graphs. Formally, we consider a graph G with vertices being the agents. An allocation
is said to be envy-free on graph G if no agent envies any of her neighbors in the graph. An allocation
is proportional on graph G if each agent gets at least the average of her neighbors’ total allocation (with
respect to her own valuation). By only considering the fairness conditions between connected pairs, the
problem could potentially admit fair allocations with more desired properties such as efficiency, and lead to
simpler and more efficient algorithms to produce them.
With regard to envy-freeness, one can easily see that an envy-free allocation in the traditional definition
is also an envy-free allocation on any graph. However, the algorithm to compute such a solution to the
former [3] has extremely high complexity in terms of both the number of queries and the number of cuts
it requires. One goal of this line of studies is to design simple and easy-to-implement algorithms for fair
allocations on special graphs. It is easy to observe that (cf. Section 2.2), an envy-free allocation protocol
on a connected graph G induces an envy-free protocol on any of its spanning trees. Therefore, trees form a
first bottleneck to the design of envy-free algorithms for more sophisticated graph families. The first result
we will show is an efficient moving-knife algorithm to find an envy-free allocation on an arbitrary tree,
removing this bottleneck. The procedure allocates the cake from the tree root in a top-down fashion and is
significantly simpler than the protocol proposed by Aziz et al. [3].
When the graph is more than a tree, the added edges significantly increase the difficulty of producing
an envy-free allocation. However, if we lower the requirements and only aim at proportionality, then it
is possible to go beyond trees. Note that though a proportional allocation can be produced for complete
graphs by several algorithms, such globally proportional solutions may be no longer proportional on an
incomplete graph. Our second result gives an discrete and efficient algorithm to find a proportional allocation
on descendant graphs, a family of graphs that are generated from rooted trees by connecting all ancestor-
descendant pairs in the tree. Descendant graphs are interesting from both practical and theoretical viewpoints
(cf. Section 2.2).
1.1 Related Work
Cake cutting has been a central topic in recource allocation for decades; see, e.g., [7,15,17]. As mentioned,
envy-freeness and proportionality are two of the most prominent solution concepts for fairness consideration
in this domain. An envy-free allocation always exists, even if only n − 1 cuts are allowed [18]. The
computation of envy-free and proportional allocations has also received considerable attention, with a good
number of discrete and continuous protocols designed for different settings [4–6, 8, 10, 14, 16, 17]. It had
been a long standing open question to design a discrete and bounded envy-free protocol for n agents, until
settled very recently by Aziz and Mackenzie [3]. For proportionality, much simpler algorithms are known
that yield proportional allocations with a reasonable number of cuts. Even and Paz [12] gave a divide-
and-conquer protocol that could produce a proportional allocation with O(n log n) cuts. Woeginger and
Sgall [20] and Edmonds and Pruhs [11] later also showed a matching Ω(n log n) lower bound.
The idea of restrictive relations, i.e., people comparing the allocation only with their peers, have also
been considered in scenarios other than cake cutting. Chevaleyre et al. [9] proposed a negotiation framework
with a topology structure, such that agents may only trade indivisible goods with their neighbors, and the
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envy also could only happen between connected pairs. Todo et al. [19] generalized the envy-freeness to
allow envies between groups of agents, and discussed the combinatorial auction mechanisms that satisfy
these concepts.
Shortly before our work, Abebe et al . [1] proposed the same notion of fairness on networks. Despite this,
the paper and ours have completely different technical contents. Abebe et al . [1] shows that proportional
allocations on networks do not satisfy any natural containment relations, characterizes the set of graphs for
which a single-cutter protocol can produce an envy-free allocation, and analyzes the price of envy-freeness.
In this paper, we focus on designing simple and efficient protocols for fair allocations on special classes of
graphs. The graph families considered in these two papers are also different.
2 Our Framework
In a cake cutting instance, there are n agents to share a cake, which is represented by the interval [0, 1]. Each
agent i has an integrable, non-negative density function vi : [0, 1] 7→ R. A piece S of the cake is the union
of finitely many disjoint intervals of [0, 1]. The valuation of agent i for a piece S is Vi(S) =
∫
S vi(x)dx.
An allocation of the cake is a partition of [0, 1] into n disjoint pieces, denoted by A = (A1, . . . , An),
such that agent i receives piece Ai, where all pieces are disjoint and
⋃
iAi = [0, 1].
2.1 Fairness Notions on Graphs
First we review two classic fairness notions in resource allocation.
Envy-Freeness. An allocation A is called envy-free if for all i 6= j, vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj).
Proportionality. An allocation A is called proportional if for all i, vi(Ai) ≥ 1nvi([0, 1]).
To account for a graphical topology, we generalize the above definitions by assuming a network structure
over all agents. That is, we assume an undirected simple graphG = (V,E) in which each vertex i represents
an agent. Let N(i) be the set of neighbors of agent i in G.
Definition 1 (Envy-free on networks). An allocation A is called envy-free on a network G = (V,E) if for
all i and all j ∈ N(i), vi(Ai) ≥ vi(Aj).
Definition 2 (Proportional on networks). An allocation A is called proportional on a network G if for all i,
vi(Ai) ≥ 1|N(i)|
∑
j∈N(i) vi(Aj).
Both definitions can be viewed as generalizations of the original fairness concepts, which correspond to
the case of G being the complete graph.
For envy-freeness, we have the following properties.
Fact 1. Any allocation that is envy-free on a graph G is also envy-free on any subgraph G′ ⊆ G.
Corollary 1. An envy-free allocation is also envy-free on any graph G.
The corollary implies that the envy-free protocol recently proposed by Aziz and Mackenzie [3] would
also give an envy-free allocation on any graph. However, the protocol is highly involved and requires a large
number of queries and cuts, which naturally raises the question of designing simpler protocols for graphs
with special properties.
Goal 1: Design simple protocols that could produce envy-free allocations on certain types of graphs.
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While envy-freeness is closed under the operation of edge removal, proportionality is not, as removing
edges changes the set of neighbors and thus also the average of neighbors’ values. Therefore, although a
number of proportional protocols are known, they do not readily translate to proportional allocations on
subgraphs in any straightforward way.
At a first glance, even the existence of a proportional allocation on all graphs is not obvious. Interest-
ingly, the existence can be guaranteed from that of an envy-free allocation, since any envy-free allocation
is also proportional on the same network. Therefore an envy-free protocol for complete graphs would also
produce a proportional allocation on any graph. In light of this, we turn to the quests for simpler proportional
protocols on interesting graph families as in the envy-free case.
Goal 2: Design simple protocols that could produce proportional allocations on certain types of graphs.
2.2 Motivations for the Two Graph Families
In this paper we focus on two graph families, trees and descendant graphs. Note that for both envy-freeness
and proportionality, we only need to consider connected graphs (since otherwise we can focus on the easiest
connected component). Without an envy-free algorithm for trees, there would be no chance to design envy-
free protocols for more complicated graph families (see Fact 1).
For descendant graphs, recall that a descendant graph is obtained by connecting all ancestor-descendant
pairs of a rooted tree (cf. Section 4 for a formal definition). Descendant graphs can be used to model the
relations among members in an extended family, where each edge connects a pair of ancestor and descen-
dant. It can also model the management hierarchy in a company, where each edge connects a superior and a
subordinate. From a theoretical viewpoint, we note that for any undirected graph G, if we run a depth-first
search, then all edges in G are either edges on the DFS tree T or a back edge of T . Thus G is a subgraph
of the upward closure T uc of T , where T uc is obtained from T by connecting all (ancestor, descendant)
pairs. Note that T uc is a descendant graph. Therefore, if there is an envy-free allocation protocol for the
family of descendant graphs, then there is an envy-free allocation protocol for any graph. This indicates that
envy-freeness for descendant graphs may be hard. Interestingly, if we relax to proportionality, we do get a
protocol on this family, as shown in Section 4.
3 Envy-Freeness on Trees
We first present an algorithm that produces an envy-free allocation on trees. The algorithm makes use of
the Austin moving-knife procedure [2] as a subroutine. Given a rooted tree T , let |T | denote the number of
vertices. For any vertex i in T , denote by T (i) the subtree rooted at vertex i.
Definition 3 ( [2]). An Austin moving-knife procedure AUSTINCUT (i, j, n, S) takes two agents i, j, an
integer n > 0 and a subset S of cake as input parameters, and outputs a partition of S into n parts, such
that both agents value these n pieces as all equal, each of value exactly 1/n fraction of the value of S. An
Austin procedure needs 2n cuts.
It should be noted that this is a continuous procedure, and it is not known that whether it can be imple-
mented by a discrete algorithm. With that being said, to the best of our knowledge, it is not known whether
Austin’s moving knife procedure can help to obtain an algorithm achieving envy-freeness (on complete
graphs) that is simpler than the algorithm in [3].
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Now we are ready to present our allocation algorithm in Algorithm ALLOCATIONTREE, which calls a
sub-procedure given in Algorithm ALGTREE.
Algorithm 1 ALGTREE (T, r, (A1, . . . , An))
Require: Tree T with root vertex r, size of tree n, an allocation A = (A1, . . . , An).
1: for each immediate child i of root r do
2: Among all remaining pieces of A1, . . . , An, pick |T (i)| pieces that agent i values the highest.
3: Let Si denote the union of these |T (i)| pieces.
4: end for
5: Allocate the remaining one piece to r.
6: for each child i of root r do
7: Apply AUSTINCUT (i, r, |T (i)|, Si) to divide Si into |T (i)| equal parts X1, . . . , X|T (i)| for i and r.
8: Run ALGTREE (T (i), i, (X1, . . . , X|T (i)|)).
9: end for
Algorithm 2 ALLOCATIONTREE (T, r)
Require: Tree T with root vertex r.
1: Let r cut the cake into n = |T | equal parts (A1, . . . , An) with respect to her valuation.
2: Run ALGTREE (T, r, (A1, . . . , An)).
Theorem 2. For any n-node tree T with root r, Algorithm ALLOCATIONTREE (T, r) outputs an allocation
that is envy-free on T with O(n2) cuts.
Proof. We will prove this by induction on the height of the tree. The base case is when the tree has only
one vertex, the root r. In this case n = 1 and the algorithm simply gives the whole set A1 to r, and the
envy-free property holds trivially. Now we assume that the theorem holds for trees of height d and will
prove it for any tree T of height d + 1. First, the root r receives exactly 1/n as she cuts the cake into n
equal pieces (in Algorithm ALLOCATIONTREE) and gets one of them (in line 5 of Algorithm ALGTREE).
In addition, in r’s valuation, each child i (of r) gets |T (i)|/n fraction of the total utility (the first for loop
in Algorithm ALGTREE), and cuts it into |T (i)| equal pieces (with respect to r’s valuation, in line 7 in
Algorithm ALGTREE) and finally gets one of them. So r thinks that child i’s share is also worth 1/n utility,
same as hers. Thus r does not envy any of her children.
Also note that all children of r pick pieces before r does, so each child i values her part Si at least |T (i)|
times of what r gets. Then the second for loop in Algorithm ALGTREE cuts this part into |T (i)| equal pieces
(with respect to child i’s valuation, in line 7 in Algorithm ALGTREE). Since child i gets one of these pieces
(in line 5 of the recursive call of Algorithm ALGTREE) she views this piece at least 1|T (i)| · |T (i)| = 1 times
what r gets. Namely, child i does not envy root r.
Among vertices inside each subtree rooted at child i of r, no envy occurs by the inductive hypothesis.
Putting everything together, we can see that there is no envy between any pair of connected vertices.
Finally we analyze the number of cuts of the algorithm. Recall that AUSTINCUT (i, j, n, S) makes at
most 2n cuts. When each vertex u is being processed in ALGTREE, it makes at most
∑
i:child of u 2|Ti| ≤ 2n
cuts. Thus in total the algorithm requires O(n2) cuts.
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4 Proportionality on Descendant Graphs
We first define descendant graphs formally.
Definition 4. An undirected graph G = (V,E) is called a descendant graph on a rooted tree T , if T is a
spanning tree of G, and there exists a vertex r such that for any two vertices i and j, (i, j) ∈ E if and only
if (i, j) is an ancestor-descendant pair on tree T rooted at r.
In other words, a descendant graph G of a rooted tree T can be obtained from T by connecting all of
ancestor-descendant pairs.
(a) a tree T with the topmost node
being its root
(b) the descendant graph on T
Figure 1: A 7-node tree and its descendant graph
We now present an algorithm that produces a proportional allocation on descendant graphs. The idea
of the algorithm can be described as a process of collecting and distributing: We start with the root vertex
holding the whole cake, and process the tree in top-down fashion. Each vertex v, when being processed,
applies a three-step procedure. (1) Collect phase: agent v collects all cake pieces that she has received
(from her ancestors); (2) Cut phase: agent v cuts these cakes into f(v) equal pieces according to her own
evaluation, for some function f(v) to be defined later; (3) Distribute phase: let each descendant of v pick
certain number of these pieces that they value the highest.
To formally describe the algorithm, we shall need the following notation. For a vertex v ∈ T , let d(v)
denote the depth of vertex v in tree T (i.e. the number of edges on the unique path from v to the root),
d = maxv d(v) denote the depth of T .
We then define a function f : T → N as
f(v) =
(
d(v) + |T (v)|
d(v) + 1
)
· d!. (1)
We first make some easy observations from this definition.
• When d(v) ≥ 1, d(v) divides f(v). This guarantees that in the algorithm described below, each
distribute step reallocates an integral number of slices.
• f(r) = |T | · d! for root r of the tree.
• f(v) = d! for every leaf v of the tree.
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Proposition 3. Function f(v) satisfies
f(v) = d! +
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
f(u)
d(u)
(2)
Proof. Define g(v) = f(v)d! . Thus g(v) =
d(v)+|T (v)|
d(v)+1 .
For each vertex v, we have
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
g(u)
d(u)
=
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
1
d(u)
(
d(u) + |T (u)|
d(u) + 1
)
=
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
(
1
d(u) + 1
+
|T (u)|
d(u)(d(u) + 1)
)
=
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
(
1
d(u) + 1
+
∑
u′∈T (u) 1
d(u)(d(u) + 1)
)
=
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
1
d(u) + 1
+
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
∑
u′∈T (u)
1
d(u)(d(u) + 1)
=
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
1
d(u) + 1
+
∑
u′∈T (v)
u′ 6=v
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
u′∈T (u)
1
d(u)(d(u) + 1)
︸ ︷︷ ︸
X
.
Now let us take a closer look at term X . Note that it is summed over all vertices u at the path between
v(exclusive) and u′(inclusive). These vertices have depth d(v)+1, d(v)+2, . . . , d(u′) in tree T , respectively.
Thus we have
X =
d(u′)∑
k=d(v)+1
1
k(k + 1)
=
d(u′)∑
k=d(v)+1
(
1
k
− 1
k + 1
)
=
1
d(v) + 1
− 1
d(u′) + 1
.
Plugging this back to the previous formula gives∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
1
d(u) + 1
+
∑
u′∈T (v)
u′ 6=v
(
1
d(v) + 1
− 1
d(u′) + 1
)
=
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
1
d(v) + 1
=
|T (v)| − 1
d(v) + 1
.
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Therefore,
1 +
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
g(u)
d(u)
=
d(v) + |T (v)|
d(v) + 1
= g(v).
To summarize, we just showed
g(v) = 1 +
∑
u∈T (v)
u6=v
g(u)
d(u)
.
Multiplying both sides by d! completes the proof.
The proportional allocation algorithm is formally presented as below.
Algorithm 3 ALGDESCENDANTGRAPH (G)
Require: Descendant graph G of tree T and root vertex r, size of tree n, depth of tree d
1: for u ∈ T in increasing order of d(u) do
// collect and cut phase:
2: Let Xu be the union of all cake pieces that vertex u possesses
3: Slice Xu into f(u) equal pieces Xu1 , . . . X
u
f(u) according to u’s evaluation function
// distribute phase:
4: for v ∈ T (u)− {u} in increasing order of d(v) do
5: Among all the remaining pieces of Xu1 , . . . , X
u
f(u), agent v takes f(v)/d(v) pieces that she values
the highest.
6: end for
7: end for
Figure 2 illustrates the f values and the execution of the algorithm on a simple 5-node tree.
10
2 4
2 2
(a) f values
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1
1 ⇒
2
2 4
1 1
1 1
⇒
2
2 2
2 2
(b) execution
Figure 2: f values of and execution of Algorithm 3 on a simple 5-node tree.
From the algorithm description and equations (1) and (2), it is easy to observe the following properties
on the number of cake slices during the algorithm.
Properties:
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(1) Every agent v, except the root of the tree, received f(v) pieces of the cake in total from her ancestors.
(2) Every agent will have exactly d! slices of cake in her possession after the algorithm terminates.
Theorem 4. For any n-node descendant graph G of a tree, ALGDESCENDANTGRAPH (G) outputs an
allocation that is proportional on G with at most n2 · d! cuts.
Proof. First note that the root r cuts the cake into |T | · d! equal pieces and finally gets d! of them, so its
value is 1/|T | fraction of that of the whole cake. As the root connects to all nodes in the graph, it achieves
exactly the average of its neighbors.
Now we consider an arbitrary node v of depth at least 1. Let N(v) be the set of v’s neighbors. Further-
more, let Na(v) be the set of v’s ancestors in T , and Nd(v) the set of v’s descendants in T . It is clear that
N(v) = Na(v) ∪Nd(v). Also note that, as G is a descendant graph, Nd(v) = T (v) \ {v}.
LetAv be the final allocation of agent v at the end of the algorithm. We are interested in S =
⋃
i∈N(v)Ai,
the union of all pieces of cake belonging to agents in N(v). Note that S consists of the following two
components:
• Those held by v’s ancestors: Each Au for u ∈ Na(v) contains d! slices from {Xui }i=1,...,f(u). These
are the leftover slices after the distribute phase of agent u.
• Those held by v’s descendants: ⋃w∈Nd(v)Aw consists of two parts:
1. The slices from {Xui } distributed by agent u ∈ Na(v) in their distribute phase to agents in
Nd(v). For each u ∈ Na(v), each agent w ∈ Nd(v) picks f(w)d(w) slices from {Xui }. In total, agent
u distributes
∑
w∈Nd(v)
f(w)
d(w) slices of cake to agents in Nd(v). From Eq (2), this number equals
to f(v)− d!.
2. The f(v)−d! slices from {Xvi } distributed by agent v in her distribute phase to her descendants.
Note that Xv comes from all ancestors u.
Note that each ancestor u of v has her collection Xu distributed first to v, then to v’s descendants, and
finally to u herself. Denote these parts by Suv , S
u
d and S
u
u , respectively. Agent v later distributes exactly
f(v)−d!
f(v) fraction of S
u
v to its descents, and keeps
d!
f(v) fraction of S
u
v to herself. Let us denote these two parts
by Suvd and S
u
vv, respectively. To avoid potential confusion of notation, we use αv to denote the valuation
function of agent v. We will show the following inequality.
αv(S
u
vv) ≥
αv(S
u
u) + αv(S
u
d ) + αv(S
u
vd)
d(v) + T (v)− 1 . (3)
Once this is shown for all ancestors u of v, we can sum these inequalities over all ancestors u and obtain
αv(Av) ≥ αv(Sa) + αv(Sd) + αv(Svd)
d(v) + T (v)− 1 , (4)
where we used the facts that
• Av = unionmultiuSuvv is what v finally has, where the notation unionmultiu stands for the disjoint union over all
ancestors u of v.
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• Sa = unionmultiuSuu is the part of cake that v’s ancestors collectively have,
• Sd = unionmultiuSud is the set of pieces that v’s ancestors give to v’s descendants, and
• Svd = unionmultiuSuvd is the set of pieces that v gives to its descendants.
Note that the numerator in the right hand side of Eq. (4) is exactly the total value of N(v), and the denomi-
nator is exactly the size of N(v). Thus the inequality is actually
αv(Av) ≥ αv(N(v))/|N(v)|,
as the proportionality requires.
So it remains to prove Eq. (3). We will examine the four sets involved in this inequality one by one, and
represent or bound them all in terms of αv(Suv ).
• αv(Suvv) = αv(Suv ) · d!/f(v), as v divides Suv into f(v) equal pieces and takes d! of them.
• αv(Suu)d! ≤ αv(S
u
v )
f(v)/d(v) , as v takes f(v)/d(v) pieces of {Xui : i ∈ [f(u)]} before u is left with d! pieces.
• αv(Sud )f(v)−d! ≤ αv(S
u
v )
f(v)/d(v) , as v takes f(v)/d(v) pieces of {Xui : i ∈ [f(u)]} before its descendants collec-
tively take (f(v)− d!) pieces.
• αv(Suvd) = αv(Suv ) · (f(v)− d!)/f(v) as v divides Suv into f(v) equal pieces and pass (f(v)− d!) of
them to descendants.
Putting these four (in)equalities and the definition of f(v) in Eq. (1) together, one can easily verify Eq. (3).
This completes the proof of the proportionality.
For the number of cuts, each agent v, when being processed, makes f(v) cuts in the cut phase. In total
the algorithm requires
∑
v f(v) ≤ n · f(r) ≤ n2 · d! cuts.
Note that though the number of cuts required here is exponential, this singly exponential bound is much
better than the one for the general protocol in [3].
5 Conclusion
This paper introduces a graphical framework for fair allocation of divisible good, defines envy-freeness
and proportionality on a graph, and proposes an envy-free allocation algorithm on trees and a proportional
allocation algorithm on descendant graphs. The framework opens new research directions in developing
simple and efficient algorithms that produce fair allocations under important special graph structures.
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